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I.

STATEMENT OF COURT'S JURISDICTION FOR APPELLATE

REVIEW
This Court has jurisdiction for appellate review pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§78-2-2(3)0).
A.

Issues Presented for Appeal

The issue presented for appeal on this decision is whether Sandy City may charge
a storm drain fee to Jordan School District notwithstanding the provisions of §10-9-106,
Utah Code ainotated, which prohibits municipalities from charging school districts all
fees except for those specifically authorized therein. Section 10-9-106 does not authorize
charging of storm drain fees. (Record 51-62).
B.

Controlling Statute

Section 10-9-106, Utah Code Annotated, provides in relevant part:
(2) A school district is subject to a municipality's land use
regulations under this chapter, except that a municipality may
not:
* * *

(c) require a district to pay fees not authorized by this
section;
* * *

(e) require a school district to pay any impact fee for an
improvement project that is not reasonably related to the
impact of the project upon the need that the improvement is
to address;...
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II,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of this Case

There are no issues of fact in dispute in this matter. The sole issue is whether
Sandy City may charge Jordan School District the storm drain fee notwithstanding the
provisions of § 10-9-106. The interpretation of this statute is a question of statutory
interpretation and is presented to the Court as an issue of law.
B*

Course of Proceedings

The Jordan School District appeals from the Order of the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County by Judge Roger A. Livingston, granting Partial
Summary Judgment and an Order entered 1 November 2001 Dismissing Remaining
Claims or Theories Without Prejudice signed by Judge Livingston on 17 December 2001
and filed with the lower court on 18 December 2001.
C.

Statement of Facts

The Board of Education of the Jordan School District is a subdivision of the State
of Utah. (Record 16-18) The Defendant Sandy City Corporation is a municipality
located within Salt Lake County. (Record 16-18)
The Jordan School District operates a high school, several middle schools, and
numerous elementary schools within the boundaries of Sandy City. (Record 16-18) In
connection with its use of property to provide education to students within the district,
Sandy City charged, and the School District paid, a one-time hook-up fee to connect
school storm drain pipes into a system of storm drainpipes constructed by Sandy City.
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(Record 16-18) The amount of the water connection fee is $3,449.00 for each new
school constructed by the School District in Sandy City. (Record 16-18) The purpose of
the hook-up fee is to pay for the cost of construction, maintenance and impact on the
storm drain system maintained by Sandy City.
Sandy City also charges a monthly "storm drain fee" to the Jordan School District
for each school located within Sandy City. (Record 16-18) The amount of the monthly
storm drain fee depends upon a complex formula set forth in Sandy City Ordinance No.
99-16, Title 17, Chapter 2 et seq. of the Revised Ordinance of Sandy City (the
"Ordinance"). (Record 16-18) The Ordinance was passed and approved by Sandy City
on 11 May 1999. (Record 16-18) Prior to 11 May 1999, Sandy City assessed a monthly
storm drain fee to the School District in the cumulative amount of $87,262.25. (Record
16-18) Since 11 May 1999, Sandy City has continued to assess the storm drain fee to
Jordan School District on a monthly basis. (Record 16-18)
The purpose of the monthly storm drain fee is purportedly to pay for the
construction, maintenance, and impact of the storm drain system. (Record 16-18)
Jordan School District retains the majority of run-off water on its site. (Record 16-18)
In addition, the Jordan School District uses its storm drains in connection with installing,
constructing, operating and otherwise using the School District's property and school
buildings in its statutory obligation to provide education to students within the School
District. (Record 16-18)
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D.

Summary of Argument

The Board of Education of the Jordan School District (hereinafter the "School
District") seeks a declaration of this Court that the storm drain fees assessed by Sandy
City are barred by §10-9-106(2)(c). A straightforward reading of the statute provides that
no fees may be assessed to the School District except for those specifically enumerated
within the exceptions set forth in §10-9-106. The fees which Sandy City now seeks to
impose upon the School District for hooking into a storm drain system are not among the
fees which a municipality may permissibly charge to a school district under the
provisions of § 10-9-106. The language of § 10-9-106 is broad. The statute provides that
it applies to any operation or other use of any area, land or building owned by the School
District. Certainly, the storm drain fees are part of the operation of and use of area and
land owned by the School District.
III.

ARGUMENT
A.

History of the Statutory Language

Prior to 1922, the Utah statutes prohibited cities and counties from "local
assessments against School Districts." Laws of 1896, Ch. CX X, Article XVI, §149.
Two cases earlier in the last century illustrate how such local assessments were reviewed.
In those cases, Salt Lake City imposed assessments. In Board of Education of Salt Lake
City v. McGonagle, 112 P. 401 (Utah 1910), Salt Lake City imposed an assessment for a
sewer. In Wey v. Salt Lake City, 101 P. 381 (Utah 1909), Salt Lake City imposed an
assessment to pave an abutting street. The assessments were payable in annual
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installments over a period of years and constituted a lien against the properties. The Utah
Supreme Court struck down these assessments under the statutes then existing because
School Districts were exempt from such assessments. In each case, the Court noted that
the assessment constituted a lien on School District property in violation of law and were
therefore invalid even though the city sought to recover for what it claimed were services
provided.
Subsequently, the Utah State Legislature passed §53-4-12, which exempted
School Districts from paying "local assessments for any purpose." This provision is now
embodied in §53A-3-408, which states:
(1)

Real and personal property held by a local School
Board is exempt from general and special taxation and
from local assessments.

(2)
This property may not be taken in any manner for
debt.
In several cases, the Utah Supreme Court held that a fee for services rendered did
not constitute a "tax or local assessment." In Murray City v. Murray City Board of
Education, 396 P.2d 628 (Utah 1964), the Court held that the Murray City School
District was required to pay a one-time sewer connection charge because such a charge
constituted a "commercial transaction for services rendered and not a tax assessment
from which School Districts are exempt." The Court then noted that an
assessment is levied under the tax power and imposed upon
the property within a limited area for an improvement to
enhance all property within that area. On the other hand, the
cost of a service is determined by the benefits conferred upon
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the occupants of the land rather than increase in the value of
the land itself. Id. 630-31.
The Murray City Court noted that laying a sewer pipe, as in McGonagle, or paving
an abutting street, as in Wey, generally benefitted the property and thus constituted
assessments. On the other hand, a service fee is based on the value received by the
School District.
Similarly, in Salt Lake County v. Board of Education of Granite School District,
808 P.2d 1056 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court held that the Granite School District
was not exempt from a county flood control drainage fee because it constituted an
"impact fee" rather than a local assessment., The reason that the fee constituted an
"impact fee" rather than a local assessment was that it was a one-time hook-up which had
an impact upon an existing system.
After these cases had been decided, and after § 17A-3-315 had been adopted in
1992, the Utah Legislature adopted §10-9-106 (applicable to municipalities), which
provides in relevant part:
A school district is subject to municipality's land use
regulations under this chapter, except that a municipality
may not:
***

(c) require a school district to pay fees not authorized by this
section;
***

(e) require a school district to pay any impact fee for an
improvement project that is not reasonably related to the

impact of the project upon the need that the improvement is
to address;...
Thus, the primary issue under the statute is whether the amounts charged by Sandy
City constitute a "fee" that is permitted under this statute. Under §10-9-106(2)(c), if the
charges by Sandy City constitute a "fee," then they may not be charged unless the fee fits
within the expressly enumerated exceptions set forth in the subsections of this section of
the statute. Further, if the fee to be charged is in the nature of an "impact fee," then it
cannot be charged to the School District without fulfilling the requirement set forth both
in §11-36-201, Utah Code Annotated et seq. and also enumerated in Call v. City of West
Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1978), and Banberry Dev. Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631
P.2d 899, 901 (Utah 1981) (specifically enumerating the requirements to impose an
impact fee). An impact fee means "payment of money imposed upon development
activity as a condition of development approval." §11-36-102(7)(a). Sandy City may not
attempt to avoid the express prohibition against imposing fees unless they are authorized
by §10-9-106 simply by recharacterizing it as a "fee for services rendered." Similarly,
Sandy City cannot impose an "impact fee" without complying with the express
conditions to do so.
Thus, the primary issue under the statue is whether the amounts charged by Sandy
City constitute a "fee." The Utah Supreme Court addressed the definition of a "fee" in V1 Oil Company v. Utah State Tax Commission, 942 P.2d 906, 911 (Utah 1996):
Our cases do not establish a bright line test for distinguishing
a tax from a fee. Rather "[h]ow such exactions should be
classified depends on their purpose." (Citation omitted).
7

Generally speaking, tax raises revenue for general
governmental purposes while a fee raises revenue either to
compensate the government for the provision of a specific
service or benefit to the one paying the fee or to defray the
government's cost of regulating and policing a business or
activity engaged in by the one paying the fee. (Citation
omitted). These cases, however, fail to delineate clearly the
distinction between a tax and a fee.. ..
We can say, however, that these definitions of a "fee" as
distinguished from a "tax" suggest that there are at least two
broad types of fees: (i) a fee for service, i.e., a specific
charge in return for a specific benefit to the one paying
the fee, and (ii) a regulatory fee, i.e., a specific charge
which defrays the government's cost of regulating and
monitoring the class of entities paying the fee. We analyze
the surcharge under both concepts to determine whether it can
be fairly characterized as a legitimate fee under the concept.
If it cannot, then it is a general revenue-raising measure and
must be classified as a tax.
Based upon the foregoing, a fee for services is a "fee." All "fees" are prohibited
by §10-9-106 unless expressly allowed by the statute in question. Thus, the fee charged
is a "hookup fee." The fee charged by Sandy City to hook into the storm drain system is
not a fee authorized under §10-9-106.
The City has argued that the fees in question apply only during the period of land
development and the approval phase by cities and counties and not thereafter. However,
the specific language of the statute in question is contrary to this position. Section 10-9106(l)(a) uses very broad language as to the circumstances in which the statute applies:
Each county, municipality, school district, special district, and
political subdivision of Utah shall conform to the land use
and development ordinances of any municipality when
installing, constructing, operating, or otherwise using any
area, land or building situated within the municipality and
8

only in a manner and for a purpose that conforms to that
municipality's ordinances.
Thus, the statute includes within its scope "operating or otherwise using" any land
area owned by the School District. Certainly, the School District operates and otherwise
uses its land in connection with operation or use of its storm drains. The plain language
of the statute shows that it applies to any operation or use of its land by the Jordan School
District.
B.

Sandy City Cannot Impose The Storm Drain Fee Upon The Jordan
School District

Sandy City asserted in the District Court that §17A-3-315 prohibits assessments of
School District property from improvements such as a storm sewer system "but permits
charges for services." The statute states in relevant part:
Except as provided in subsection (2), a municipality may not
levy an assessment against a property owned by the federal
government, the state of Utah, any county, school district,
municipality or other political subdivision of the state of Utah
or by any department or division of any such public agency
even though such property is benefited by improvements
made, but each such public agency is authorized to contract
with a municipality for the making of such improvement and
for the payment of the cost thereof to the municipality.
Nothing in this section shall prevent a municipality from
imposing or a public agency from paying reasonable charges
for any services or materials actually rendered or supplied by
the municipality to the public agency, including, by way of
example and not in limitation, charges for water, lighting or
sewer services. Utah Code Annotated § 17A-3-315( 1).
Sandy City cites this statute for the proposition that a municipality is permitted to
assess to school districts charges for water, lighting or sewer services. However, the
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statute does not say anything of the sort. First, the storm drain fee is not like a water or
light fee where the School District actually consumes electricity or water. Nothing is
delivered to the School District for consumption. Further, the storm drain system already
exists and will be serviced regardless of the School District's hooking into it.
Section 17-3-315(1) expressly provides that a municipality may not levy an
assessment against property owned by a school district, but expressly authorizes a
municipality to contract for a fee to provide such services and improvements. In
addition, this statute states that "nothing in this section" shall be construed to prohibit a
municipality from imposing charges for services. This statute merely grants power to
municipalities to enter into contracts to provide services to other governmental entities
and prohibits assessments except for any services or materials actually rendered or
supplied by the municipality to the public agency under this particular section. The
intention of the drafters of this statute is clear: They wanted to make sure that by
prohibiting municipalities from levying assessments against government property that
municipalities could nevertheless contract to provide such benefits and this prohibition
should not be construed to otherwise prohibit municipalities from imposing a fee for
services. However, the permissive language which allows municipalities to charge a fee
for services is expressly limited to interpreting this particular section only. This
section expressly does not apply to the provisions of § 10-9-106, which prohibits
assessment or imposition of any "fee" against a school district unless expressly allowed
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by the subsections of that particular section. Thus, §17A-3-315 has absolutely no
application to this case.
The School District submits that if Sandy City intends to impose a fee upon Jordan
School District for a one-time hook-up to its storm drain system, it must impose an
impact fee and in so doing must first comply with the provisions of §11-36-201 et seq. It
is true that there is an impact to the system when the Jordan School District hooks into
Sandy City's storm drain system. However, that impact must be carefully measured
under the provisions of impact fee statutes and cannot merely be assessed as a monthly
"fee." Indeed, §10-9-106(c) expressly prohibits such fees. Thus, it is not "illogical" for
the School District to assert that it is not required to pay a "fee" on a monthly basis to
Sandy City for a one-time hook-up to the storm drain system. To the contrary, the logic
of this situation dictates that Sandy City must comply with the provisions of impact fees
as allowed under §10-9-106 instead of assessing a monthly fee as Sandy City has
purported to do.
C.

Well Established Rules of Statutory Construction Require This Court
To Adopt The School District's Interpretation

The primary rule of statutory construction is to give the statute the plain meaning
of the language used. Whenever this Court is called upon to interpret a statute, the
"primary goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of the purposes the statute
was meant to achieve." Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998). The best
evidence of the Legislature's intent is the plain language of the statute. See Perrine v.
Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996). Therefore, "where the
11

statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we do not look beyond the language's plain
meaning to divine legislative intent." Horton v. Royal Order of the Sun, 821 P.2d 1167,
1168 (Utah 1991). The plain meaning of the language used in §10-9-106 forbids a
municipality from assessing any type of fee unless the fee is expressly enumerated in the
exceptions to §10-9-106(c).
Sandy City urges this Court to find that there is a conflict between §10-9-106 and
§17A-3-315. Indeed, if the statutes are read as Sandy City urges, for the sake of
argument, then there is an unavoidable conflict between them because §10-9-106 plainly
prohibits Sandy City from charging a storm drain fee to the School District in connection
with its use of its property, whereas §17A-3-315 would allow Sandy City to assess such
fees. However, it is well-established that this Court must interpret the statutes so as to
avoid such conflict if it is possible to do so. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Jerz v.
Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770, 773 (Utah 1991): "It is our duty to construe each act of
the legislature so as to give it full force and effect. When a construction of an act will
bring it into serious conflict with another act, our duty is to construe the acts to be in
harmony and avoid conflicts." {Citing Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318(Utah
1983)). There is no contradiction between §10-9-106 and §17A-3-315 because §17A-3315 specifically limits the provision that a municipality may impose reasonable charges
for services or materials actually rendered or supplied to interpretation of the provisions
of "this section," i.e., to interpretation of §17A-3-315 alone. This Court cannot accept
Sandy City's suggested interpretation because to do so it must find that §10-9-106
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conflicts with §17A-3-315. However, the interpretation adopted by the School District
avoids any conflict.
Further, in the event this Court were to find that §10-9-106 indeed conflicts with
§17A-3-315, the Court must interpret §10-9-106 to control over §17A-3-315 because
§10-9-106 was enacted after §17A-3-315. As the Utah Court of Appeals stated in Ellis v.
Utah State Retirement Bd, 757 P.2d 882, 884-85 (Utah Ct. App. 1988):
We acknowledge the authority governing implied repeals of
legislation. As a general proposition, implied repeals are not
favored and are found only if there is a manifest
inconsistency or conflict between the earlier and later statutes.
(Citation omitted) Subsequently enacted statutes relating to
the same subject matter as previous statutes are, if possible, to
be construed so as to make the later enactments harmonious
with the former provisions. (Citation omitted) Nonetheless,
[W]here a consistent body of laws cannot be
maintained without the abrogation of a previous law, a
repeal by implication of previous legislation . . . is
readily found in the terms of the later enactment. It is
the necessary effect of the later enactment construed in
light of the existing law that ultimately determines an
implied repeal. . . . [Wjhere conflict is readily seen by
any application of the later enactment in accord with
[the legislative] intent, it is clear that the later
enactment is intended to supersede the existing law.
(Citation omitted) This is so because when there is an
irreconcilable conflict between the new provision and the
prior statutes relating to the same subject matter, the new
provision is deemed controlling as it is the later expression of
the Legislature. (Citation omitted) (editorial alterations and
omissions in original)
Thus, the interpretation of Sandy City must either be rejected in favor of finding
no conflict between the two statutes or this Court must find that §10-9-106 controls over
13

§17A-3-315 if a conflict is unavoidable. However, the interpretation suggested by Sandy
City is precisely the opposite of the construction demanded by these rules of statutory
construction, i.e., Sandy City urges this Court to avoid conflict by ignoring and nullifying
the plain language of §10-9-106. The basis of the Court's decision must be the simple
fact that Sandy City may not impose any fees in connection with the use of Jordan School
District's property unless such fees are expressly permitted in the sub-parts to §10-9-106.
However, because a storm drain fee is not among the fees that a municipality may impose
on a School District, this Court must declare that as a matter of law the storm drain fee is
unlawful.
IV.

THE FEE SANDY CITY SEEKS TO IMPOSE IS AN IMPACT FEE THAT
FAILS TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS NECESSARY TO ADOPT
SUCH A FEE
In addition, Sandy City attempts to avoid its obligation to perform necessary

studies and assessments to charge an appropriate impact fee by mischaracterizing the fee
it charges as a "monthly service fee." In fact, Sandy City provides no service. It is
merely charging for the impact of Jordan School District hooking into its storm drain
system. An impact fee is a one-time fee as a condition of development approval.
However, the fact that Sandy City fails to appropriately assess an impact fee as a part of
its development approval only shows that it has not properly assessed an impact fee. An
impact fee cannot be converted into a service fee merely by charging it on a monthly
basis and calling it a service fee. Once again, there is no evidence or even a suggestion
that Sandy City actually provides any service; rather, it merely charges for the impact of
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the Jordan School District hooking into its system. School districts would prefer to pay
a one time hookup fee or impact fee rather than a monthly fee because then they can
include the cost of the fee in construction bonding and initial construction costs.
V.

PROHIBITING SANDY CITY FROM CHARGING A MONTHLY FEE IS
MOST CONSISTENT WITH THE STATUTORY SCHEME
This latter point also resolves the suggestion of Sandy City that it is unreasonable

to allow the School District to benefit from hooking into the Sandy City storm drain
system without paying for it. First, there is no evidence that hooking into the storm
drainage system changes the system any more than natural run-off which must be drained
regardless. Indeed, it is likely that the School District actually puts less water into the
system than historical natural run-off because the School District retains almost all water
on its school sites. The School District is not asserting that it need not pay for the impact
of hooking into a storm drain system. However, the School District maintains that the
appropriate fee to be charged is an impact fee which complies with the statutory
requirements of assessing impact fees in the State of Utah under §11-36-201 etseq.
Thus, the entire statutory scheme makes eminently good sense. Sandy City may charge
for the impact upon its system; however, it cannot charge a monthly fee for such services
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because a monthly fee is not expressly permitted under Section 10-9-106. Any fee not
expressly permitted under Section 10-9-106 is prohibited.
DATED this a ^

day of May, 2002.
BURBIDGE, CARNAHAN, OSTLER & WHITE

Blake T. Ostler
Attorneys for Appellant
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